Erik Voorhees blocked me on Twitter, for correctly pointing out he has not honored his commitment (in writing), to ensure all hardforks are safe by adding replay protection

Erik Voorhees signed the following statement:

Some exchanges intend to list BTU and all of us will try to take steps to preserve and enable access to customers' BTU. However, none of the undersigned can list BTU unless we can run both chains independently without incident. Consequently, we insist that the Bitcoin Unlimited community (or any other consensus breaking implementation) build in strong two-way replay protection. Failure to do so will impede our ability to preserve BTU for customers and will either delay or outright preclude the listing of BTU.

Source: https://www.bitfinex.com/bitcoin_hardfork_statement

After committing to this key safety feature, of strong to way replay protection, he has now backed out of the agreement. Erik now supports 2x, which does not include strong replay two-way replay protection. Erik then tried to twist the meaning of words saying 2x was not "consensus breaking", since it has consensus. This is clearly not what the commitment means, it uses the words consensus to mean consensus rules, not "community consensus". Besides, there is not community consensus for 2x anyway, saying so is arrogant.

Erik cannot face up to the truth, so decided to block me on Twitter instead.

Does Voorhee's word mean nothing?

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Bitcoin

How e-wallet services ensure my private key is securely stored?

As far as I understand, my web-wallet only store an encrypted version of my private key and the clear version is required to sign transactions where I am on the inputs.

Two solutions are possible:

  1. The web-wallet send me the encrypted version which is decrypted on the browser side. The transaction is signed and sent back to the web-wallet.

  2. I send to the web-wallet my password through an SSL channel. It decrypts my private key and sign the transaction.

In 1. My private key can be shortly visible on my browser memory. If my computer is infected, hackers may capture my private key and get my money.

In 2. My password is sent to the server and could be intercepted and if the web-wallet is infected, it can steal both my password and my private key.

So, both solutions look dangerous. Of course I can use an offline service such as Armory to sign my transactions, but If I want to still use a web-wallet I would need to get a better understanding on how my private key is stored and used.

Are the two solutions mentioned the only correct ones?

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What would be a safe way to store large amounts of Bitcoin long term to ensure safety from loss?

What would be a safe way to store large amounts of Bitcoin long term to ensure safety from loss?

Is it safe to use Bitaddress.org to generate private keys and use them to generate multi-sig address, writing private keys on a paper. Then signing transactions from my multi-sig address on offline computer.

Is that the best way?

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How does lighting network ensure all parties cooperate

I somewhat understand the two way channels used in lightning. But I fail to see how trust is avoided.

If I’m the middle node I’m perfectly fine with forwarding a payment, if I received the payment first. The initial payer can reason that he will only make the payment if all intermediate nodes have shifted the payment to the receiver. It seems like until at least one party takes the risk the payment is in some kind of Mexican standoff.

How is this avoided / cryptograpically enforced?

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