[Voorhees] Bitcoin’s inflation schedule is set for the next 100 years: transparent, unwavering, and known to all parties. US Dollar’s inflation schedule is unknown even 1 year out: opaque and manipulated quarterly. One model mathematical & civilized; the other political & antiquated.

[Voorhees] Bitcoin’s inflation schedule is set for the next 100 years: transparent, unwavering, and known to all parties. US Dollar’s inflation schedule is unknown even 1 year out: opaque and manipulated quarterly. One model mathematical & civilized; the other political & antiquated. submitted by /u/Blockfolio
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Bitcoin – The Currency of the Internet

Blockchain is not a database, it’s a protocol for syncing the databases. The point of a blockchain is not to “store” or “distribute” data, it is to make sure mutually distrusting parties are all on the same page.

Blockchain is not a database, it's a protocol for syncing the databases. The point of a blockchain is not to "store" or "distribute" data, it is to make sure mutually distrusting parties are all on the same page. submitted by /u/Bitcoin-Laundry
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Bitcoin – The Currency of the Internet

“LN is a solution that will take time and community effort to make work. If you look at alternatives and they look slick and are throwing lavish parties with @SnoopDogg, hired booth babes, posting photos of rented lambos, they are spending that money now to charge you rent later.”

"LN is a solution that will take time and community effort to make work. If you look at alternatives and they look slick and are throwing lavish parties with @SnoopDogg, hired booth babes, posting photos of rented lambos, they are spending that money now to charge you rent later." submitted by /u/healingpainterr
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Bitcoin – The Currency of the Internet

How to handle lottery function in Bitcoin if some parties leave the protocol?

Consider there are $ n$ parties $ P_1,\cdots,P_n$ having their identities as $ id=1,\cdots,n$ . They wish to calculate $ f(s_1,\cdots,s_n)=(s_1+\cdots+s_n) \bmod n$ , where $ s_i$ are individual parties secret. Parties are using Bitcoin to execute the protocol.

Now, I want to handle the function $ f$ if some of them leave the protocol. Suppose $ P_3$ and $ P_4$ said in the beginning that they might exit the lottery in mid-way. Their final decision of leaving/continuing will be known in the real-time in mid of execution of the protocol. If both of them leaves the protocol then $ s_3$ and $ s_4$ should not be included in computing $ f$ , and the winner should not be among $ P_3$ and $ P_4$ . But if either of them continues the protocol then their input should be included in computing $ f$ .

Recent Questions – Bitcoin Stack Exchange

Ethan Heilman: “My research on Bitcoin privacy in tweet form: TumbleBit uses an intermediary tumbler to allow parties to make private payments that are fast, confidential, and safe. The tumbler cannot violate your privacy, nor steal your bitcoins. TumbleBit is fully compatible with today’s Bitcoin.”

Ethan Heilman: "My research on Bitcoin privacy in tweet form: TumbleBit uses an intermediary tumbler to allow parties to make private payments that are fast, confidential, and safe. The tumbler cannot violate your privacy, nor steal your bitcoins. TumbleBit is fully compatible with today’s Bitcoin." submitted by /u/eragmus
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Bitcoin

How does lighting network ensure all parties cooperate

I somewhat understand the two way channels used in lightning. But I fail to see how trust is avoided.

If I’m the middle node I’m perfectly fine with forwarding a payment, if I received the payment first. The initial payer can reason that he will only make the payment if all intermediate nodes have shifted the payment to the receiver. It seems like until at least one party takes the risk the payment is in some kind of Mexican standoff.

How is this avoided / cryptograpically enforced?

Recent Questions – Bitcoin Stack Exchange